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Abstract 
Energy efficiency is widely recognized as a cost-effective strategy to meet energy demand. The U.S. 
energy service company (ESCO) industry generates significant energy savings and other benefits 
through installing and maintaining energy efficiency, renewable and other types of projects. In this 
study, we evaluate factors that may explain trends in the economic performance of U.S. ESCO projects 
by analyzing project level data for ~7,000 U.S. ESCO industry projects. We find that real project 
investment levels normalized for floor area have increased over time in ESCO projects across market 
segments. However, the dollar value of energy savings and other reported benefits have not kept pace 
with increases in real project investment levels over time. The latter have increased 100%-500% in 
various market segments from 1990 to 2017. We conduct an econometric analysis to decompose the 
drivers of these underlying trends. Number of measures and a changing mix of conservation measures 
are the primary factors that correlate with the long-term increase in project investment levels. 
However, our analysis is only able to account for less than 50% of the increase in real investment levels. 
We discuss additional factors, and conclude discussing policy implications and outlining long-term 
research needs.
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. energy services company (ESCO) industry provides energy savings and other benefits through 
comprehensive building retrofits, efficient equipment installation and other energy services. This 
private-sector industry has a 40-year track record of providing cost-effective energy efficiency, primarily 
to customers in the public and institutional sectors. The ESCO industry delivers significant incremental 
energy savings each year. In 2012, ESCO-implemented projects delivered energy savings (electricity, gas 
and other resources) of approximately 224 million MMBtu or about 1% of total annual energy 
consumption for all U.S. commercial buildings (Carvallo et al., 2015). 
Larsen et al. (2012) define an ESCO as: 
“A company that provides energy-efficiency-related and other value-added services and for 
which performance contracting is a core part of its energy-efficiency services business. In a 
performance contract, the ESCO guarantees energy and/or dollar savings for the project 
and ESCO compensation is therefore linked in some fashion to the performance of the 
project.”  
ESCOs deliver cost and energy savings primarily through the energy savings performance contract 
(ESPC) business model. ESPCs are long-term contracts between ESCOs and end-use customers that 
enable customers to finance large energy efficiency, onsite generation, and other types of energy 
projects without the need for significant up-front capital. In an ESPC, the ESCO typically guarantees that 
the project will generate a specified annual stream of savings sufficient to pay back the project 
installation and financing costs. ESPC distinguishes ESCOS from other energy efficiency service providers 
that may install efficient equipment, but not provide performance guarantees. Nearly three-quarters of 
2014 ESCO industry revenue came from performance contracting (Stuart et al., 2016). Non-ESPC 
agreements, such as fee-for-service or design-build1 projects, made up about 15% of revenue; power 
purchase agreements (PPA), consulting and other services made up 10% of industry revenue (Stuart et 
al., 2016). 
Public policy has also played an influential role in the development of the U.S. ESCO industry, 
specifically its popularity in the public/institutional sector (Goldman et al., 2005; IEA, 2017a). First, 
nearly all states and the federal government have enabled performance-based contracts through 
legislation that authorizes institutional sector entities to enter into long-term contracts with ESCOs. In 
these arrangements, capital investments in high efficiency equipment, controls, lighting, renewables 
and onsite generation are repaid through energy and operational savings over the expected lifetime of 
the project. Second, ESCOs have also utilized and leveraged financial incentives (e.g., rebates) offered 
by many U.S. electric and gas utilities for installation of high-efficiency equipment which can shorten 
the payback times for customers for high-efficiency and renewable energy investments. Utility rebates 
were particularly important in the earliest years of the ESCO industry in order to help overcome 
customers concerns regarding installation and technical performance of high efficiency equipment.                                                              1In a design-build project, the ESCO provides such services as energy auditing, project design and construction management, 
typically for a fixed fee, and does not contractually guarantee a specific level of energy or cost savings. 
   
2  
Past studies suggest a changing environment for the U.S. ESCO industry. Larsen et al. (2012) found that 
project investment levels were increasing somewhat faster than benefits in ESCO projects implemented 
between 1990 and 2008. Since that time, a range of economic conditions and government policies has 
affected the ESCO industry: the 2008 financial crisis, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act 
(ARRA) of 20092, and Presidential mandates3. Stuart et al. (2018) reported that after 20 years of growth, 
ESCO industry revenue appeared to flatten between 2011 and 2014 at $5.3 billion (nominal $) and that 
the financial crisis, ARRA, and other factors may partly explain the trend. 
A key objective of this paper is to address an important gap in recent research on the economics of 
energy efficiency, specifically U.S. ESCO industry projects, by exploring factors that may explain trends 
in project investment levels over time.  We categorize ESCO projects into five contiguous vintages that 
reflect macro-economic trends, significant changes in electricity sector policies, and ESCO industry 
maturity (see Table 1).4 
Table 1. ESCO industry vintages used in this paper 
Vintage Description 
1990-1997 ESCOs mature as performance contractors. Public policy programs support the ESCO industry 
in consolidating its performance contracting business model (e.g., ESPC legislation passed in 
many states). 
1998-2003 Electricity industry restructuring and retail competition creates a perceived opportunity for 
utilities to establish and/or buy many ESCOs. The California crisis brings this expansion to a 
halt, fundamentally altering the composition and structure of the ESCO industry 
2004-2007 ESCO activity is positively influenced by resurgence in state-level energy efficiency policies 
as well as re-authorization of ESPCs by the federal government (Larsen et al., 2012). 
2008-2011 This period includes the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 and subsequent years in 
which the U.S. economy experienced a severe recession and high unemployment. Federal 
stimulus packages increase ESCO activity in institutional sector (Goldman et al., 2011), but 
their reduced focus on performance contracting counters some of this effect (Stuart et al., 
2018). 
2012-2017 Between 2012 and 2017, post-recession economic growth is slow and the cost of capital (i.e. 
interest rates) are low, which encourages long-term commitments. Additional federal policy 
stimulus boosts ESCO activity. 
 
A primary motivation for this research is that the long-term viability of a private sector efficiency 
services industry depends on its ability to deliver cost-effective projects that are highly valued by end 
users. This paper is intended to inform U.S. policymakers, ESCO industry executives, end-users, and 
other stakeholders interested in continuing to foster a robust private sector energy efficiency services                                                              2 ARRA provided billions of dollars to federal, state and local government agencies for energy efficiency projects. 3 The main presidential mandate under the Obama administration called for the federal government to acquire $4 billion in 
energy service performance contracting (ESPC) between 2013 and 2016. 4 It is important to note that ESCO industry growth is somewhat correlated with growth in GDP. 
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industry. Analysis of trends in the U.S. ESCO industry may also be useful for policymakers and 
stakeholders in Asia, Europe, and other emerging markets.  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a literature review of ESCO 
industry development, market barriers and potential policy drivers. Section 3 describes our data 
sources and overall methodological approach. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics of key ESCO 
project variables. In section 5, we investigate potential ESCO project investment level drivers and their 
relative influence on investment trends using a regression model. Section 6 summarizes our findings, 
explores the impacts of cost increase in ESCO project economics, and identifies future research needs. 
2. Research on ESCO industry, project economics and market 
trends 
Most literature on the U.S. and international ESCO industries has focused on emerging ESCO models, 
broad market trends, and barriers to end users engaging in ESPC (e.g. Bertoldi et al., 2014, 2007; 
Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017; Hilke and Ryan, 2012; Marino et al., 2011; Nakagami and Murakoshi, 
2010; Okay and Akman, 2010; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Vine, 2005; Vine et al., 1999). A number of 
studies focus on barriers to ESCO industry development and potential policy drivers in specific 
European countries, for example Soroye and Nilsson (2010) and Kindström et al. (2017) in Sweden, and 
Pätäri and Sinkkonen (2014) and Pätäri et al. (2016) in Finland. In the UK, Hannon and Bolton (2015) and 
Hannon et al. (2013) examined public policy to support ESCO activity. Polzin et al. (2016) reported on 
the role of ESCOs in overcoming barriers to retrofitting public street lighting in Germany. The IEA (2017, 
2016) includes updates on ESCO market activity in China, India, the European Union and the U.S. 
In terms of economic analysis of ESCO projects, the majority of studies to date do not rely on empirical 
research and field evidence, but instead focus on economic concepts (e.g. Jaffe et al., 2004), theoretical 
models (e.g. Faggianelli et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2015) or engineering estimates of investment 
levels and potential savings (e.g., McKinsey & Company, 2009). Hilke and Ryan (2012) noted that there 
is a lack of data and empirical evaluations of energy efficiency policies that would enable broad 
evaluation of impacts and benefit-cost ratio comparisons. 
Available empirical analyses of the economic performance of energy efficiency projects in the U.S. have 
focused primarily on the evaluation of utility program portfolios rather than project level economics. 
For example, Hoffman et al. (2017, 2015) and (Molina, 2014) accessed annual data reported by utility 
program administrators to state public utility commissions to estimate the cost of delivering electric 
kWh savings for U.S. ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs at the portfolio and program level, 
but not at the individual project level. Gillingham and Palmer (2014) reviewed empirical evidence on 
outcomes of three U.S. energy efficiency program and policy approaches including information, 
financial incentives and energy efficiency standards. 
Most European empirical studies of energy efficiency economics focus on the programmatic- or sectoral 
levels. For example, Rosenow and Bayer (2017) conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the EU Energy 
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Efficiency Obligations5 program at large. O’Malley et al. (2003) applied publicly available energy and 
policy data and conducted surveys to examine barriers to all available cost-effective6 energy efficiency 
in three Irish market sectors: mechanical engineering, brewing, and the higher education sector. Very 
few U.S. or international studies have conducted empirical analyses of efficiency project investment 
levels and savings for the markets served by ESCOs. One study that has analyzed project trends 
reported that project investment levels (and by turn simple payback times) were increasing faster than 
the rate of inflation in Japan (Nakagami and Murakoshi, 2010). Those findings are consistent with 
Larsen et al. (2012).   
Finally, other studies may have provided empirical analysis of project economics, but did not examine 
trends over time. For example, Burlig et al. (2017) used machine learning techniques to estimate 
aggregate realized savings from energy efficiency projects in CA K-12 schools implemented during 2008-
2014. However, their analysis is constrained to the K-12 schools market in California and covers a 
narrow period. 
3. Data sources and methods 
This study analyzes ESCO-implemented project and measure level data from two datasets: the 
LBNL/NAESCO database of projects and the eProject Builder (ePB)7 online database system. The 
LBNL/NAESCO database has served as the basis for a number of reports about the U.S. ESCO industry 
(Bharvirkar et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2005, 2002; Larsen et al., 2012). This is the first time that 
measure level information from the ePB system is used in a formal analysis. We also draw from 
information on ESCO industry and market trends in aggregate from previous LBNL reports (Goldman et 
al., 2005; Satchwell et al., 2010; Stuart et al., 2018, 2013) and a review of ESCO and energy efficiency 
project economics literature. 
3.1 LBNL/NAESCO database 
LBNL has collected information from ESCO-implemented projects for more than two decades. The 
majority of the projects come from the accreditation process of the National Association of Energy 
Service Companies (NAESCO)—a national trade association for the ESCO industry. As part of this 
process, ESCOs seeking national accreditation submit applications that include detailed information 
from recently developed projects.8 A small percentage of projects (<10%) in the database have been 
provided by state agencies that manage energy efficiency programs and the U.S. Department of                                                              5 The EU Energy Efficiency Directive requires EU states to establish energy efficiency obligation (EEO) schemes. EEOs are 
resource standards for energy efficiency that require energy companies (e.g., utilities) to achieve annual energy savings of 
1.5% of annual sales to end-use customers (European Commission, 2012). 6 The authors define “cost-effective” as projects where the investment in energy efficiency provides a better rate of return 
than the cost of capital to the organization. 7 See https://eprojectbuilder.lbl.gov/ 8 LBNL has limited information to determine whether the submitted projects are representative of all of the ESCOs’ projects; 
thus, we do not assume that these data comprise a random sample from the population of U.S. ESCO projects. In our analyses, 
we report “typical” findings, such as median values and interquartile ranges for the available data, similar to Larsen et al. 
(2012) and Goldman et al. (2005). Average or mean values may produce different results, as they may be influenced by a few 
large projects that dominate the result. 
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Energy’s Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). Data typically includes project investment 
levels; estimated, guaranteed, and at least one year of verified savings data (physical and monetary); a 
list of the energy conservation measures installed, and information on project facility characteristics 
such as floor area or location. Appendix A.6 provides more detail about the data fields included in the 
database. 
The LBNL/NAESCO database includes 6,314 projects implemented from 1982 to 2017, with the vast 
majority of the projects (> 98%) installed after 1990. This database contains projects representing over 
$16 billion (2016$) in total project investment levels without financing costs. The majority of U.S. ESCO 
activity has historically occurred in the MUSH markets (municipal and state governments, 
universities/colleges, K-12 schools, and healthcare facilities). In recent years, these markets combined 
have constituted ~65% of ESCO industry revenue (Hopper et al., 2007; Satchwell et al., 2010; Stuart et 
al., 2018, 2014). The LBNL/NAESCO database shows a similar breakdown: MUSH market projects 
account for about 70% of aggregate project investment levels. The federal market represents another 
25% of all investment in the database, which is consistent with the sector’s 21% share of ESCO industry 
revenue (Stuart et al., 2018). The private sector makes up about 8% of investment in the database, 
which is also consistent with its share of ESCO industry revenue (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. ESCO project investment level in the LBNL/NAESCO database by market segment (1990-
2017) 
Market segment ESCO project cost 
(M$ 2016) 
Share of total investment in 
LBNL/NAESCO database (%) 
Federal Govt. $ 3,732 23 % 
State/Local Govt. $ 3,217 20 % 
Univ./Colleges $ 2,361 14 % 
K-12 Schools $ 4,988 30 % 
Healthcare $781 5 % 
Private Sector $ 1,305 8 % 
All Sectors $ 16,384 100% 
 
We perform several quality control analyses on and organization of the LBNL/NAESCO database raw 
data. First, we exclude projects that qualify as outliers; that were developed before 19909; or that lack 
basic information on project characteristics (e.g., market segment, investment level, or location). 
Second, we classify project installation date into five different vintages as described earlier. Third, we 
follow earlier ESCO industry studies and assign each project to one of seven possible dominant retrofit                                                              
9 We excluded projects installed prior to 1990 because the U.S. ESCO industry was in its infancy and does not really represent 
the industry as only very few ESCOs were submitting their accreditation data. 
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strategies (DRS): onsite generation, lighting-only, major HVAC, minor HVAC, motors and drives, non-
energy, and water conservation. Each DRS represents a group of measures that have similar investment 
intensity and that serves to characterize a project. Finally, ESCOs report the dollar value of energy and 
water savings in their projects. However, ESCOs use very different methods to estimate these savings 
and key input values and assumptions are often not transparent (e.g., assumed escalation rates in 
electricity and fuel prices). Thus, we develop and implement a method to recalculate the dollar value of 
energy and water savings with standardized retail prices for each ESCO project. See Appendix 
subsections 1, 2, and 3 for a detailed explanation of the methods and outcomes of the quality control 
and data manipulation process. 
3.2 eProject Builder (ePB) database 
ePB is a secure, online database that enables ESCOs and their customers to upload and track data for 
their energy savings performance contracting and other energy projects through the life of the contract 
term. ePB standardizes the collection of detailed project- and measure level information including 
measure investment levels, proposed and verified physical and monetary savings, and details about 
project financing. From a structural perspective, a key difference between ePB and the LBNL/NAESCO 
database is that ePB contains energy conservation measure (ECM) level investment levels and annual 
savings information. The LBNL/NAESCO database contains investment levels and annual savings at the 
project level only. 
The ePB system was first released in June 2014 includes ~500 projects representing $4 billion (nominal 
dollars) in overall project investment levels. About 75% of the projects in the ePB database are federal 
market projects; thus, the data in ePB are not representative of all market segments served by the ESCO 
industry.  The ePB database includes projects implemented from 1998 to 2017, which is a shorter time 
horizon than the LBNL/NAESCO database of projects (1982- 2017). Finally, about a third of the projects 
in ePB are also included in the LBNL/NAESCO database. 
Given these limitations, we do not use ePB data for direct economic analyses, but as a support to 
specific analyses within this study. For example, the detailed ECM level data is useful for examining ECM 
level trends in savings and investment levels in federal projects whose effects may extend beyond the 
federal government market segment. 
3.3 Analytical Approach 
A central objective of this paper is to understand the extent to which various factors may contribute to 
trends in ESCO project investment levels over time. To explore this issue, we implement an Oaxaca-
Blinder (O-B) decomposition to understand how much of the variation in the outcome variable – 
investment levels – is due to either changes in variables that influence project cost or changes in the 
sensitivity of project cost to these variables.  
The O-B decomposition was introduced independently by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) as a way to 
decompose the sources of differences in two groups. The labor economics literature commonly 
employs O-B decomposition to unearth sources of differences in wage levels among groups 
differentiated by gender, race, or other similar indicator. The two-fold O-B decomposition splits the 
difference in outcomes in two terms (Hlavac, 2018): 
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In this equation, A and B correspond to the groups, and R corresponds to a reference group that can be 
formed by weighing A and B in different ways.10 The explained term captures the impact on the 
outcome of changes of a given variable across groups. For example, assume that we are examining two 
groups (male and female), that the outcome is wage levels, and the variable is years of education. The 
explained term would capture how much wage difference is attributed to differences in years of 
education across the two groups. The reference regression coefficient, βR, is calculated from the whole 
sample. The unexplained term captures the impact on the outcome of changes in the regression 
coefficient across groups. In this example, it would show how the gap in wages might be due to 
discrimination. The unexplained term can also reflect the impact of unobserved variables. The 
unexplained term can be divided further in the portion that relates to group A, and the one that relates 
to group B.11 The advantage of the O-B method is that it quantifies the share of the change in the 
outcome (e.g. wage level) that is attributable to explanatory variables, or unexplained. A formal 
explanation of the O-B decomposition method can be found in Jann (2008). 
A few energy-related studies have used the O-B decomposition to estimate the impact of demographic 
and preference changes on energy consumption (see Levinson, 2014; Morikawa, 2012). In this paper we 
follow the insight from Leard et al. (2019) and assign an older and a newer vintage to each of the two 
groups A and B. Then, the explained portion will capture the share of investment level change due to 
variation over time of each potential driver such as project savings, floor area, or types of measures 
installed. 
4. Descriptive statistics and trends 
This section provides a succinct overview of trends for key factors that are reported in the 
LBNL/NAESCO database that may correlate with trends in the economics to customers of ESCO projects. 
More information on ESCO industry and market trends can be found in the latest LBNL State of the U.S. 
ESCO Industry (Carvallo et al., 2018). 
4.1 Key performance metrics 
Table 3 summarizes information on the median cost, savings and contract features of ESCO projects in 
various market segments during the last decade (2008-2017).  Median investment levels (in absolute 
terms) for ESCO projects are much higher in the federal sector than in any other market segment 
($5.3M vs. $1.3-3.5M). However, this is primarily due to the larger size of federal facilities being 
retrofitted compared to the size of facilities in other market segments. Thus, when we normalize                                                              10 The reference is formed by weighting coefficients for the regressions of groups A and B, or by pooling both groups together 
and running a “reference” regression. For more details see Neumark (1988) and Cotton (1988) 
11 This split is accomplished by comparing the regression coefficient of group A and B against the reference coefficient.  
(1) 
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median project investment values by the floor area that is retrofitted in a facility, we find that project 
investment levels per square foot are approximately 50% higher in the MUSH market segment 
compared to federal government facilities.  
Projects typically save 20% to 40% of annual baseline consumption depending on market segment. In 
contrast, normalized savings levels—expressed as savings per square foot—are relatively similar across 
markets. Investment level differences and savings level similarities translate to typical payback times 
that vary from 8 years for private sector projects to 12-13 years for public sector projects (e.g. federal 
and state/local governments). This difference reflects the fact that most private sector customers have 
higher investment hurdle rates than customers in the public/institutional sector market (Goldman et. al 
2002). 
Table 3. Typical values for key project performance metrics (2008-2017) 
Key metric Federal Govt. Healthcare K-12 Schools Private State/Local Govt. Univ./Colleges 
Floor area (MM sqf) 1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 
 (n=140) (n=82) (n=778) (n=73) (n=405) (n=220) 
Investment level  $5.3 $2.1 $2.3 $1.3 $2.7 $3.5 
(MM $2016) (n=187) (n=95) (n=730) (n=138) (n=416) (n=222) 
Investment per sqf  $6.8 $8.9 $8 $5.1 $9.3 $6.5 
($2016/sqf) (n=108) (n=69) (n=709) (n=70) (n=359) (n=189) 
Annual cost savings  $0.3 $0.3 $0.2 $0.1 $0.2 $0.3 
(MM $2016) (n=138) (n=63) (n=693) (n=54) (n=415) (n=194) 
Annual cost savings  $0.7 $0.7 $0.5 $0.5 $0.8 $0.7 
per sqf ($2016/sqf) (n=98) (n=61) (n=678) (n=48) (n=368) (n=172) 
Energy savings as %  38% 19% 18% 19% 21% 20% 
of utility bill (%) (n=14) (n=27) (n=408) (n=21) (n=200) (n=83) 
Contract length  13 9 14 11 13 11 
(years) (n=213) (n=77) (n=711) (n=20) (n=423) (n=197) 
Simple payback  12 9 13 8 12 11 
time (years) (n=130) (n=53) (n=647) (n=52) (n=359) (n=170) 
 
4.2 Trends in project benefits 
Project benefits— annual energy and non-energy dollar savings—have generally increased in the past 
three decades (see Figure 1). Federal and state/local government markets savings have increased by 
300% and 100% in the last three decades, respectively. Typical savings have stabilized in the remaining 
market sectors at around $ 0.5/sqf. Saving levels have historically been lower in the K-12 schools, 
university/colleges, and private markets. 
4.3 Trends in project investment levels 
Larsen et al. (2012) observed that project investment levels were increasing faster than project savings 
over the 1990-2008 timeframe. Table 4 summarizes median values for project investment levels by 
market segment and vintage. Median absolute project investment levels have increased by more than 
500% in the federal, healthcare and private sectors between the earliest and most recent vintages. 
Project investment levels have grown nearly 1,000% in the state/local government market segment, 
from a median of $0.6 million in the earliest vintage (1990-1998) to a median of over $6 million in the 
most recent vintage (2012-2017). Investment levels in the K-12 schools and university/college projects 
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have increased ~200% between the first and most recent vintages. The university/college market 
segment has the highest median project investment levels of any market in the most recent vintage 
with a median project investment level of ~$7 million. 
  
Figure 1. Trends in normalized typical monetary savings by source 
As we look at trends in project investment over the last three decades, it is important to understand the 
influence of public policy and economic drivers.  For example, during the 2008-2012 period, ESCOs that 
were developing projects responded to the very large economic stimulus provided by the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) as well as the impacts of a very severe economic recession.   
Median project investment levels increased substantially in the ARRA period for the federal 
government sector, whereas there were significant decreases for the private sector during this same 
period. These findings likely reflect the expanded federal activity buoyed by ARRA and austerity in the 
private sector amidst economic uncertainty and a slower-than-expected economic recovery. It should 
be noted that median project investment levels increased substantially in the most recent vintage—the 
post-ARRA period (2012-2017) — for the state/local government, K-12 schools and university/college 
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market segments.  This trend may reflect project investments made by these customers to address 
ongoing deferred maintenance issues as reported by Larsen et al. (2012). 
Table 4. Median project investment levels without financing charges by market sector and vintage 
 Median project investment levels 
(million 2016$) 
  
 Market segment 1990 
- 
1997 
1998 
- 
2003  
2004 
- 
2007  
2008 
- 
2011  
2012 
- 
2017 
Growth 
between 
first and 
last vintage 
(%) 
Growth 
between 
second and 
last vintage 
(%) 
Federal government $0.8 $2.9 $3.3 $5.3 $5.5 588% 90% 
Healthcare $0.5 $1.2 $2.5 $2.7 $3.0 500% 150% 
K-12 Schools $1.6 $1.4 $2.0 $2.1 $4.9 206% 250% 
Private $0.4 $0.6 $1.8 $1.0 $2.9 625% 383% 
State/Local government $0.6 $1.5 $2.1 $2.0 $6.2 933% 313% 
University/Colleges $2.5 $1.7 $2.6 $3.4 $7.3 192% 329% 
 
Trends in absolute level of project investment can be driven, in part, by changes in the size of the 
facilities being retrofitted.  All market segments report significant increases in normalized project 
investment levels since the earliest vintage (the 1990-1997 period), although K-12 schools, 
universities/colleges and private sector project investment levels per square foot have been plateauing 
in more recent vintages. 
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Figure 2. Trends in normalized project investment levels 
We compare these overall project investment level trends with specific ECM level investment trends for 
the nine most frequently reported measures within the ePB database (see Figure 3). We estimate 
normalized investment levels by dividing inflation corrected investment levels by floor area of the 
retrofitted space (there is no ECM-specific floor area information). The ePB database includes a 
relatively larger share of projects for the two most recent vintages (2008-2011 and 2012-2017). In 
general, we find that normalized ECM investment levels have doubled or tripled for most ECMs since 
the 2008-2011 period. This finding suggests that there appears to be both measure level and overall 
project level factors concurrently affecting the long-term increase in project investment levels.  
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Figure 3. ECM normalized investment levels for the most frequently reported measures in ePB 
5. Contribution of factors that affect project investment level 
trends 
Based on previous research and discussions with ESCOs, we hypothesize that the level of project 
investment is correlated with the following factors: 
• An increase in ESPC projects that are more expensive per square foot than non-ESPC 
projects; 
• A changing mix of project measures with the increasing presence of more capital-intensive 
measures (e.g., onsite generation, roof replacement) which we characterize by defining a 
dominant retrofit strategy for each project; 
• An increase in energy savings; and 
• An increasingly comprehensive mix of measures in projects. 
We hypothesize that projects that produce higher absolute energy savings (MMBtu) would also have 
higher absolute investment levels due to the effort involved in designing and implementing a retrofit 
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project that is expected to yield greater energy savings.12 There is evidence that more capital-intensive 
technologies can produce more customer savings (DOE, 2017).  
We also included census sub-region as a categorical variable in earlier models, but it was not a 
statistically significant variable and thus excluded from the final regression results. Discussion with 
ESCOs revealed that labor and materials costs might also affect project investment levels. Labor costs 
for contractors do vary somewhat by region (e.g. higher in New England and California compared to the 
Midwest and South). However, institutional sector customers (Federal and state government) are 
required by law to pay prevailing union wages in implementing projects; thus wage differentials 
between high-cost and low cost regions of the U.S. are not as great as in private sector projects, which 
are a small part of the ESCO market. We do not include labor or materials factors because that 
information is not reported with project level data in the LBNL/NAESCO database. However, we do 
examine the evolution of these variables in the discussion section to assess to what extent they may 
relate to the unexplained term in the O-B decomposition. 
5.1 Modeling ESCO project investment levels 
We employ the following econometric model to study the relationship between project investment 
levels and other project factors13:  
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6
∙ 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
In this model, the subscripts i and t represent project and vintage of installation year, respectively; inv is 
the absolute project investment in $2016; ESPC indicates whether the project was developed using a 
performance contract; retrofit_strat indicates the dominant retrofit strategy that characterizes the 
project (i.e., project composition); floorarea is the surface area of the retrofitted facilities measured in 
ft2; savings are physical energy savings measured in MMBtu14; and num_measures is the number of 
installed conservation measures (i.e., project comprehensiveness). See Appendix A.4 for additional 
details about the method, implementation, and results. 
5.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results 
We run a O-B decomposition in R using the oaxaca package (Hlavac, 2018). When running a two-fold 
decomposition, there is a choice on the selection of the reference group used to measures changes 
                                                             
12 We exclude physical water savings from the savings variable because water units (gallons) cannot be readily converted to 
energy units (MMBtu). Physical water savings also tend to produce lower monetary savings than energy savings and they are 
less prevalent across ESCO projects than energy savings. 
13 We analyze the potential multicollinearity between the continuous variables in our specification: floor area, savings, 
comprehensiveness, and investment levels. We calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to test for collinearity among 
explanatory variables. We run the analysis for each market segment and find no collinearity among the variables of interest. 
More details can be found in Appendix A.4.2.2 
14 We use physical resource savings instead of monetary savings to isolate from the effect of commodity prices that are not 
under the control of the project developer and hence should be unrelated to project investment levels. 
(2) 
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across groups and changes of regression coefficients. We employ the method proposed by Neumark 
(1988) using a pooled regression across our sample of projects. 
The O-B decomposition is set up by selecting projects that belong to either the first or the last vintage in 
our sample. We use 1990-2000 as the early vintage because it reflects the maturation of the ESCO 
industry in the 1990s and the initial euphoria during electricity industry restructuring that retail 
competition would lead to significant growth in the ESCO industry. This choice for first vintage for the 
O-B decomposition also has sample size advantages compared to the first vintage defined in Table 1. 
The most recent vintage is still 2012-2017. We then assign each project to group A (last vintage) or 
group B (first vintage). We create dummy variables to identify the dominant retrofit strategy in each 
project and omit “Lighting-only” to prevent perfect multicollinearity. 
Group B, the first vintage, has 600 projects with complete data, while group A has 394 projects. The 
mean project investment level is $2.10 million and $4.68 million for group B and A, respectively. The 
mean difference in project investment levels to be explained with the O-B decomposition is then $2.58 
million, which is approximately 120% and consistent with market level metrics (see Table 4). 
5.2.1 Regression results for floor area and resource savings 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results for groups A and B. Coefficients for floor area and resource 
savings (the two continuous factors) are consistently significant and positive, as intuition suggests. 
Projects that retrofit a larger footprint and that have higher savings correlate with higher investment 
levels. Coefficients across groups have remained stable for floor area, but more than doubled for 
savings. The latter means that an additional unit of savings correlates with 2.5 times higher investment 
levels in the recent vintage compared to the older vintage. This is consistent with a low-hanging fruit 
phenomenon: achieving one unit of savings in recent projects requires more than twice as much 
investment as in older ones.   
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Table 5. Group A and B regression coefficients for O-B decomposition 
Type of 
factor Group Factor name 
First vintage 
(Group B) 
Last vintage 
(Group A) 
Continuous  Floor area 1.06
*** 
 (0.14) 
1.67*** 
 (0.26) 
Continuous  Resource savings (MMBtu) 41
*** 
 (6.96) 
100*** 
 (11) 
Discrete  Comprehensiveness (number of different project measures) 
147493*** 
 (28142) 
16758 
 (29954) 
Categorical 
Contract type 
(base: non-
ESPC) 
ESPC 515346
* 
 (226425) 
-1809359* 
 (712301) 
Categorical 
Dominant 
Retrofit Strategy 
(base: Lighting 
only) 
Major HVAC 1258561
*** 
 (334223) 
3042969* 
 (1186177) 
Minor HVAC -428084  (293882) 
653645 
 (1198332) 
Motors and drives -461213  (315032) 
101266 
 (1361321) 
Non-energy 518296
* 
 (313541) 
2175361* 
 (1180040) 
Onsite generation 2801293
*** 
 (536411) 
4397355*** 
 (1258157) 
Water conservation -874058  (837882) 
3439504* 
 (2018833) 
Continuous   Constant -388427  (245605) 
1843584 
 (1187116) 
          
    Number of observations 600 394 
    Adjusted R2 0.3975 0.4036 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% respectively. 
Accounting for project level savings – rather than measure level savings - may obscure the contribution 
that specific ECMs have to investment levels. There is no measure level data in the LBNL/NAESCO 
database, but there are projected savings and investment level data at the measure level in the ePB 
dataset. We run a simplified regression of investment levels over savings controlling by market segment 
and ESCO using the ePB dataset over a sample of the most prevalent ECMs (see Table 6).   
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Table 6. Regression coefficients for energy savings from selected ECM Categories using ePB 
measure level data 
ECM Category 
Measure  
Count 
Coefficient 
for savings 
Lighting Improvements 642 0.137* 
Building Automation Systems/Energy Management 
Control Systems (EMCS) 528 19.72*** 
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning 485 2.65* 
Water and Sewer Conservation Systems 305 4.23 
Chiller Plant Improvements 241 12.97*** 
Boiler Plant Improvements 236 9.35* 
Chilled Water, Hot Water, and Steam Distribution 
Systems 201 27.75*** 
Building Envelope Modifications 154 -0.25 
Renewable Energy Systems 151 115.59*** 
 
The regression coefficients for the more common ECMs in Table 6 are generally lower than the project-
level energy savings coefficients in Table 5. The project level coefficients range between 41 and 100 and 
the ECM level coefficients between 0.14 and 150. This is expected because savings are additive, which 
means that the coefficients for resource savings in Table 5 should be the mean sum of coefficients from 
all ECMs installed. Projects will be composed of a mix of measures and hence a mix of energy savings 
potential. 
5.2.2 Regression results for ESPC, comprehensiveness, and DRS 
ESPC shows a remarkable change over time. In the first vintage, a performance-based contract (i.e., 
ESPC) correlates with increased project investment levels. This may be explained by higher transaction 
costs related to RFP processes and long development cycles; M&V required for verifying guaranteed 
savings; and building the costs of the ESCOs’ performance risk into project investment (Tetreault and 
Regenthal, 2011). Reliance on ESPC correlates with reductions in project investment in the most recent 
vintage compared to non-ESPC, which is generally unexpected. This could be explained by the maturity 
and refinement of ESCO performance contracting business models, which have been used by ESCOs for 
more than 20 years in the U.S. Indeed, the performance requirements for ESPC projects in some market 
segments (e.g., MUSH) have eased over time, with durations15 that are shorter than the full contract 
term (e.g. 1-3 years). This change has reduced the performance risk premium of ESPC projects in recent 
vintages. We must always consider that data may not be fully representative, especially if sample sizes 
are low as in this case16.                                                              
15 In performance contracting, project performance is assessed during a specific evaluation period. This duration has been 
shortening in time, according to our conversations with ESCO stakeholders. 
16 We tested a few different specifications for equation (1), excluding some variables and removing outliers. In all cases, the 
coefficient for ESPC in the recent vintage was negative. 
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Comprehensiveness in ESCO projects can represent the number and types of measures installed. Larsen 
et al. (2012, p.24) define comprehensiveness as: 
“Installation of multiple measures that address the full range of energy efficiency and, in some cases, 
supply opportunities in an individual building as well as any interactive effects among system 
components or building systems.” 
In this analysis, we define comprehensiveness as the number of different types of measures. This 
definition provides a readily quantifiable metric necessary for the purposes of regression analysis. 
Regression coefficient for comprehensiveness is statistically significant in the first vintage only. Results 
suggest that project investment levels increase by about $0.15 million for each additional measure 
installed. While not significant, the coefficient for the recent vintage is an order of magnitude lower. 
The effect of and changes in comprehensiveness may potentially be explained by the fact that 
investment levels are driven more by the specific types of measures installed than the number and 
diversity of measures.  
The types of measures installed are measured through the dummy variables that represent one of 
seven possible dominant retrofit strategies that a project can implement. Results show that major 
HVAC, non-energy, and onsite generation are statistically significant and positive. This is expected 
because the baseline is lighting-only measures, which are typically the least capital-intensive retrofit 
strategy (see Figure 3). Their relative impact in investment is also reasonable: an onsite generation DRS 
correlates with higher investment levels than major HVAC DRS, which in turn correlates with higher 
investment levels than non-energy DRS.  
The three strategies mentioned above have significantly increased their impact on investment levels 
over time which can be seen by comparing the coefficients for groups B and A. For example, onsite 
generation projects were $2.8 million more expensive than lighting-only projects in the first vintage, but 
they are $4.4 million more expensive in the last vintage. Since we do not have information on the 
capacity of the onsite generation projects, one plausible hypothesis is that customers have been 
deploying larger generation systems in their premises over time. This is supported by the distributed PV 
system size trends reported by Barbose and Darghouth (2016). In the case of major HVAC retrofits, 
investment levels increased from $1.3 million to $ 3 million for these systems over time. A plausible 
explanation could be related to deeper and more complex HVAC retrofits, although part of that 
variation would be captured by the comprehensiveness variable. Another plausible explanation is that 
HVAC systems have become more expensive, perhaps due to an increase in materials costs. We explore 
this hypothesis further in the discussion and conclusion section. 
5.2.3 O-B decomposition results 
The O-B decomposition results are reported in Table 7. We report results using both pooled 
regressions. The “no indicator” one does not use the group indicator (i.e. the vintage) as a covariate; 
the “indicator” one does include this covariate. The literature has generally preferred to employ the no 
indicator method proposed by Neumark (1988), but we report both for comprehensiveness. 
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Table 7. O-B decomposition of investment level differences for two weighting methods 
 Pooled, no indicator  Pooled, indicator 
 Explained Unexplained  Explained Unexplained 
Floor area -1% 14%  -1% 14% 
Resource savings (MMBtu) 2% 25%  2% 25% 
Comprehensiveness (number 
of different project measures) 12% -37%  
7% -32% 
ESPC Contract 1% -82%  0% -81% 
Major HVAC 5% 1%  8% -2% 
Minor HVAC 2% -4%  0% -2% 
Motors and drives 7% -6%  2% 0% 
Non-energy 1% 1%  5% -3% 
Onsite generation 9% -2%  10% -3% 
Water conservation 0% 1%  0% 1% 
Lighting-only 7% -6%  0% 0% 
Constant 0% 148%  0% 148% 
      
Total share 46% 54%  34% 66%  
Results show that the changes in modeled variables – floor area, savings, comprehensiveness, 
composition (i.e., dominant retrofit strategy), and a performance contract – are able to explain 
between 34% and 46% of the increase in project investment levels over time, depending on the pooling 
method. This means that between 54% and 65% of the increase in investment levels remains 
unexplained. This fraction could be explained by structural changes in project development that 
underlie the data, or is explained by unobserved factors that have changed over time that are not 
tracked in our data.  
Among the explained portion, changes in the dominant retrofit strategy utilized in ESCO projects 
explain about 25-30% of increase in project investment levels. This is due to the increased deployment 
of onsite generation (9%-10% of variation in investment levels) and major HVAC (5%-8% of variation) 
over time (see also Figure A.5.2 in Appendix). Changes in the comprehensiveness of ESCO projects (i.e., 
the number of installed measures) also have high impact and explain between 7% and 12% of the 
increase in project investment levels. However, comprehensiveness was not statistically significant for 
the recent vintage regression (see Table 5). Changes in floor area, resource savings, and ESPC contribute 
marginally to increases in project investment levels over time, largely because these variables have not 
changed significantly between the earliest and most recent vintages.  
The unexplained term is challenging to understand when groups are formed by two vintages17. 
Technically, this term represents changes in the regression coefficients over time. A regression                                                              
17 Furthermore, the unexplained term can be difficult to measure and understand in general. See for example the discussion in 
Elder et al. (2010) 
   
19  
coefficient represents how much the outcome variable changes as a response to variation in the 
independent variable, controlling by the other variables in the model. In the labor economics literature, 
when groups are based on race or gender, the unexplained term is usually assumed to represent 
gender or racial discrimination in the labor market. This is because the regression coefficient is 
describing a structural property of the labor market, which treats one group compared to another 
group differently. 
In this study, we split groups by vintage to explain trends in project investment levels. Then, changes of 
the regression coefficients may describe structural changes over time in project design, development, 
construction, and operation that are not captured in the variables used in the regression. For example, 
we had hypothesized earlier that savings may be affected by a low-hanging fruit phenomenon. This 
means that a unit of savings correlates with a larger change in investment in recent years compared to 
the first vintage, which may reflect that achieving savings is becoming more costly. This is consistent 
with the findings in Table 7, which indicate that 25% of investment level increase is related to change in 
the regression coefficient of resource savings, not to changes in savings per se. To directly track the 
low-hanging fruit phenomenon and include this variable as an explained term, we would need an 
objective metric for ease of savings in buildings. To our knowledge, this metric is unavailable and 
potentially difficult to produce. 
The high contribution to investment level decrease of ESPC models in the unexplained term is worth 
discussing. The low explained contribution of ESPC to project investment level increase suggests that 
there has not been dramatic changes in industry-level use of ESPC over time. The unexplained term for 
ESPC suggests that there are unobserved properties of ESPC projects that have made them less 
investment intensive over time than non-ESPC projects.  
6. Other factors that may affect project investment levels 
The unexplained fraction of the O-B decomposition can reflect unobserved factors that are not part of 
the ESCO data. We explore a few relevant factors in this section chosen based on discussion with ESCO 
stakeholders.  
First, changes in financing costs (e.g. interest rates) over time may influence project investment levels. 
A reduction in interest rates makes the cost of capital less expensive, which can lead to increases in 
project investment as less money has to be spent in financing and debt and more money can be used 
for the cost of the installation. The LBNL/NAESCO database cannot be used to test this hypothesis 
because of data quality and availability issues (e.g. many ESCOs report project costs and exclude 
financing costs over the contract term).  However, we use reported project interest rates from ePB to 
run a simple regression against ePB project investment and find that they are negatively correlated: 
lower interest rates are correlated with higher investment levels.18 Nominal interest rates have 
decreased substantially and remained low over the last decade (St Louis FED, 2018). It follows that part                                                              
18  ESPC legislation in many states stipulates the maximum payback time for an ESCO project (often including financing costs). 
Thus, if interest rates are lower (which leads to lower financing costs), ESCOs can propose and install a more comprehensive 
set of measures with higher installation costs and still meet the customer’s constraint on maximum payback time. 
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of the recent ESCO project investment level increase may be correlated with the decrease in interest 
rates. 
Second, inclusion of more non-energy measures (NEMs) by ESCOs in projects as well as changes to 
internal ESCO cost components (e.g., labor, materials, and markup) may also explain increases in 
project investment levels over time. Non-energy measures (NEMs) are generally more capital intensive 
than ECMs (Larsen et al. 2012). An increase in adoption of non-energy measures over time could be 
correlated with higher investment levels. There is evidence that ESCO customers have increased the use 
of ESPC for capital and facility improvement needs (Stuart et al., 2016). This increase is partly informed 
by tighter capital budgets in the state/local government and constraints in the use of appropriations in 
the federal government (Gilligan, 2018). Institutional customers then use ESPC to fulfill their capital 
improvement needs by combining a larger number of NEMs with ECMs in energy efficiency projects. To 
test this hypothesis, we would need NEM level cost data, which is not available in the LBNL/NAESCO 
database. 
Third, there is little or no publicly available information on the actual cost structure of past ESCO 
projects. In its simplest form, direct project investment levels can be decomposed into internal labor 
costs, materials expenditures, and a project level markup that includes indirect costs, overhead, and 
profit. For purposes of this analysis, we exclude financing costs that are charged by 3rd party financial 
institutions that finance ESPC projects as well as any incentives/rebates that were offered by utility 
energy efficiency programs and accessed by ESCOs and/or customers. Changes in any of these three, 
unobservable internal cost components—labor, materials, and markup—can help explain absolute 
project investment level increases that have been captured in the temporal trend component of the 
regression analysis. 
To examine these factors more deeply, we evaluate U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data and find that 
costs for labor pertinent to the ESCO workforce have increased less than 10% during the analysis period 
of 1990-2017 (BLS, 2017). We also find that costs for equipment and materials such as HVAC has 
increased around 30% over the analysis time frame (St Louis Fed Reserve, 2017), but that costs for 
other equipment such as photovoltaic (PV) systems has decreased by about 80% over the same time 
frame (Barbose and Darghouth, 2016). We also evaluate markup information from projects in the ePB 
database and find that this investment level component has remained essentially stable over the past 
twenty years.  
There is inconclusive evidence that trends in materials and equipment costs in ESCO projects are a 
significant factor that partially explains the long-term trend in project investment level increases 
captured in the unexplained term of the O-B decomposition. We also find that it is unlikely that ESCO 
labor costs and markup are a significant factor in the long-term increase in project investment levels. 
However, there is still a need of project-level data for these different factors to include them as 
observed variables in the O-B decomposition framework.   
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7. Conclusion 
Recent research has suggested that the economic performance of projects installed by ESCOs may be 
changing over time. We perform analyses to characterize and understand what may explain these 
trends by leveraging two detailed databases which include ~7,000 U.S. ESCO industry projects: the  
LBNL/NAESCO database of ESCO projects and eProject Builder (ePB) system. The LBNL/NAESCO 
database has served as the basis of a number of LBNL reports about the U.S. ESCO industry. This is the 
first time that we incorporate measure level information from the ePB system into our analysis of ESCO 
project economic performance. 
We find that projects are becoming larger (in terms of floor area and investment levels) and more 
comprehensive, are generating more savings, and installing more capital intensive measures. The trend 
has led to steady increases in normalized project investment levels ($/ft2) across markets and relatively 
modest increases in normalized savings over time (savings/ft2). Median project investment have 
increased by 192 to 933% in various market sectors between the earliest and most recent vintage. 
Normalized monetary and physical energy savings have increased or remained stable following the 
deployment of projects that are more comprehensive and new technologies. 
We conduct the first Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition over U.S. ESCO projects, which explains between 
34% and 46% of the investment level increases, depending on method. Number of measures and 
project composition (mix of measure types) are the main variables that explain investment level 
increases. Virtually all the explained variation comes from these two factors. Floor area and savings 
have marginally contributed to investment level increase in the last three decades. Results for the role 
of ESPC are inconclusive with the data at hand. We explore the unexplained fraction of investment level 
increase by studying factors that are not explicitly reported in the LBNL/NAESCO database, such as 
labor, material costs, and markup. Their trends suggest little influence in explaining investment level 
increases, but further formal analysis is required to test these factors as hypotheses. 
The long-term trend in project investment levels clearly has an impact on project economics from the 
customers’ perspective. Larsen et al. (2012) reported a decrease in project benefit-cost ratios across a 
number of market segments, but noted that there were a number of non-energy benefits that were not 
considered in their estimates. We report a similar finding—reported project benefits are growing at a 
slower rate than the trend in project investment levels. This finding implies that customer benefit-cost 
ratios are likely to have declined over time while project simple payback times have increased. It should 
be noted that long-term increases in simple payback times have also been reported by other sources 
(e.g., State of the U.S. ESCO Industry).  It is important to reiterate that—as was the case with Larsen et 
al. (2012)—there appears to be a significant amount of unreported non-energy benefits that are a 
component of the value proposition for customers and ESCOs.  
We have also noted the role of public policies in enhancing and influencing the development of the U.S. 
ESCO industry (e.g., state and federal legislation encouraging ESPC, utility energy efficiency programs). 
Our analysis of ESCO project results by market sector illustrates the impact of these public policies in 
the sense that ESCO activity in the U.S. has been most successful in public/institutional markets 
compared to private sector and healthcare customers (e.g. greater market penetration, higher savings 
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levels, more comprehensive projects). The fact that nearly all states and the federal government have 
adopted ESPC legislation means that the impact of public policies is most clearly seen across market 
segments rather than across states (e.g., public/institutional customers that are included in legislation 
vs. those market segments that are not covered).19 
These results suggest several future research directions. First, this is the first attempt to identify ESCO 
project investment level structure using a data-driven approach. This technique has several 
shortcomings that are reflected in explaining less than 50% of the increase in investment levels in the 
past three decades. There is a need to better understand the cost structure of ESCO firms and projects 
by collecting quantitative and qualitative data and to expand on past research on ESCO workforce costs 
(Goldman et al., 2010). For example, contracting costs may be very specific to the ESCO industry and its 
trends may not be well represented by blue-collar labor costs. We need a deeper understanding of 
changes in ESCO labor composition and cost structure in the last two or three decades to test this 
hypothesis. One specific research effort may involve harnessing the power of eProject Builder to 
conduct a deep analysis of projects completed by the federal government—to learn more about the 
components that drive overall project investment levels, ongoing monitoring of savings, and other 
emerging trends. 
There has also been an increase in non-energy measures and benefits within contracts, but also a 
recognition that many other non-energy benefits are difficult to monetize and include in a contractual 
framework (Carvallo et al., 2018). Previous studies that have analyzed ESCO project economics suggest 
that there is a substantial number of projects that may be producing non-energy benefits to their 
customers (e.g., see Larsen et al., 2012). There is a need to identify the types of non-energy benefits 
that  customers of ESCOs are considering in their project assessments and develop techniques to 
incorporate them more formally in a cost-effectiveness framework.   
Despite these challenges, the U.S. energy service company industry has produced significant energy 
savings, largely in institutional and public facilities, by installing and maintaining energy efficient 
equipment and other cost and resource-saving measures.  Given the significant remaining market 
potential of this industry, it is important to continue to understand project investment levels and the 
associated benefits over time. Improving the understanding of project level economics will enable 
local/state/federal stakeholders to make decisions that are more informed and, ultimately, unlock the 
full potential of this growing industry.   
                                                             19 There are some differences between in the authorizing legislation for ESPC at the Federal level vs. state governments (e.g. maximum payback time, terms and conditions, solicitation processes) and among states (e.g., institutional/public market segments covered by legislation in each state). 
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Technical Appendix 
A.1. Pre-analysis quality control 
This section describes the data preparation process prior to analysis. 
Project selection 
We exclude projects in the LBNL-NAESCO database that contain extreme outliers20, that were 
developed before 1990, or that lack basic data values, e.g., date, location, or market identifiers. 
Moreover, not all projects report the requisite fields required for each analysis (e.g., a project may be 
missing information on investment levels, savings or floor area). Table A.1.1 shows the number and 
share of projects that contain key variables used in this study. 54%-87% of projects report any of the 
variables of interest (e.g. 67% of projects include floor area (ft2)).  Only 42% of projects contain all of 
the listed variables.  Sample sizes for results in this paper vary depending on the number of projects 
that contain the requisite data for the specific analysis.  
Table A.1.1. LBNL/NAESCO database: overview of project sample sizes 
  Project count Share of total projects 
Full database 
Pre-screening 6,314 100% 
Post-screening 5,510 87% 
Selected variables 
Date completed 5,510 87% 
Project investment levels 4,957 79% 
Floor area 4,204 67% 
Total MMBtu savings 
(actual, guaranteed, or 
projected) 3,429 54% 
Total dollar savings 4,385 69% 
Contract type 5,329 84% 
Contract length 4,587 73% 
Installed measure(s) 5,510 87% 
Contains all selected 
variables 2,649 42% 
 
Cleaning and standardization 
Previous LBNL research noted that the information reported by ESCOs varies in terms of quality and 
completion (Larsen et al. 2012). To address quality issues, we implemented a methodology to improve 
                                                             20 Extreme outliers are data points that are so far outside the norm that they are likely erroneous. 
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the accuracy and consistency of project level information used in our analyses. The quality control and 
quality assurance process involves two key processes: 
1. Screen projects for missing and/or questionable data: 
o Remove projects that lack key data fields necessary for time trend analyses (e.g., U.S. 
state, project completion year, market segment) 
o Exclude projects installed before 1990 when the ESCO market was nascent 
o Exclude projects from outside the U.S. 
o Perform an outlier analysis to identify projects for exclusion from specific economic and 
energy analyses  
2. Classify and standardize data: 
o Calculate the monetary value of energy (electricity, gas, oil) and water savings with 
standardized retail prices for commercial/institutional or industrial customers. We use 
standardized retail prices because ESCOs often do not provide information on retail 
rates or tariffs or assumptions regarding future electricity and fuel prices when they 
report monetary savings from projects. 
o Classify projects that fall in specific time periods (i.e., vintages) 
o Assign each project to a dominant retrofit strategy (e.g., major HVAC, onsite 
generation) 
o Convert all nominal dollar values into real terms ($2016) 
We describe specific classification and standardization methods in the following subsections. 
Vintages 
This study focuses primarily on evaluating ESCO project level economic trends over time. Accordingly, 
we categorize projects into five contiguous vintages. This report includes the first three vintages from 
Larsen et al. (2012) plus two additional vintages for the 2008-2017 period. We define vintages 
according to the following criteria: 
• 1990-1997: “ESCOs mature as performance contractors.” During this period, the nascent ESCO 
industry from the early 1980s developed into a relatively mature industry focused on 
performance contracting which distinguishes them from HVAC or lighting contractors. The 
extensive deployment of utility ratepayer-funded energy efficiency and demand side 
management programs provided additional support to a growing ESCO industry (Larsen et al., 
2012). 
• 1998-2003: “Electricity Industry Restructuring and Retail Competition.” During this period, 
efforts to restructure the electricity sector affected the ESCO industry. Many utilities either 
established ESCOs or acquired small existing ESCOs as part of a strategy that allowed them to 
provide energy services in states that allowed retail competition (e.g., retail energy services 
companies could provide energy commodity and services).  Electricity restructuring and retail 
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electric completion stalled primarily because of the California electricity crisis in 2000/2001. The 
promise of a robust, national retail energy services market receded as part of the fallout from 
the California electricity crisis. Many utilities then sold off their ESCO subsidiaries and other 
ESCOs consolidated and merged, which fundamentally affected the structure of the ESCO 
industry (Larsen et al., 2012). 
• 2004-2007: “Resurgence.” ESCO activity was positively influenced by resurgence in state level 
energy efficiency policies as well as re-authorization of ESPCs by the federal government (Larsen 
et al., 2012). 
• 2008-2011: “Recession” This period includes the financial crisis of 2007 and subsequent years in 
which the U.S. economy experienced a severe recession and high unemployment. ARRA, 
designed to spur economic growth, provided a massive, short-term (3 years) boost of funding 
for energy efficiency investment in public and institutional facilities. ARRA directed federal, state 
and local agencies to invest the funds quickly, and many agencies complied by addressing a 
backlog of “shovel-ready” energy efficiency projects in their facilities (Goldman et al., 2011). 
Some ESCOs reported that an expected boost in the performance contracting market did not 
materialize, because under time pressure, agencies often used ARRA funds to pay directly for 
short-payback efficiency measures, rather than entering into ESPC contracts for more 
comprehensive projects (Stuart et al., 2018). 
• 2012-2017: “Post-Recession” Between 2012 and 2017, overall economic growth was slow and 
the cost of capital (i.e. interest rates) was low.  The President’s Performance Contracting 
Challenge (PPCC) called for federal agencies to implement $4 billion in ESPC (Harada, 2016). 
Federal agencies exceeded the goal, awarding 340 projects valued at over $4.2 billion (Harada, 
2016), which provided a boost to the ESCO industry.  
Dominant retrofit strategies 
Following earlier studies (Hopper et al., 2005; Larsen et al., 2012), we assign each project to a dominant 
retrofit strategy (DRS). The DRS corresponds to a general category of measures that typically influences 
the project’s investment levels and savings. Each DRS represents a grouping of measures that can be 
characterized by a dominant retrofit strategy in which selected measures (e.g., new HVAC equipment, 
onsite generation, only lighting) may influence investment (and savings) levels. 
Previous research categorized projects in the database into six DRS categories: lighting-only, minor 
HVAC, major HVAC, onsite generation, non-energy, and other (Larsen et al. 2012). For this paper, we 
create two additional dominant retrofit strategies—motors and drives, and water conservation—that 
better characterize the dominant mix of measures installed in certain projects. Table A.1.2 provides a 
summary of the retrofit strategies, their assignment logic, and characteristics of each energy 
conservation measure (ECM) and non-energy measure (NEM).  Section A2 in this appendix provides a 
detailed description of the methodology used to assign projects to DRS. 
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Table A.1.2. LBNL defined dominant retrofit strategy classification (adapted from Larsen et al. 
2012) 
 
LBNL dominant retrofit 
strategy (DRS) 
Criteria Example of ECM and/or NEM included in this category 
Lighting-only Projects include only this type of 
measure 
Technologies installed include only various lighting 
efficiency measures and controls. 
Minor HVAC Normalized project investment of 
$5/ft2 or less. 
Technologies installed include less-capital intensive HVAC 
measures and controls (and exclude major HVAC equipment) 
and may include lighting and other measures. 
Major HVAC Normalized project investment of 
$5/ft2 or more. 
Technologies installed include major HVAC equipment 
replacements (e.g., boilers, chillers, cooling towers, HVAC 
distribution system improvements) and may include other 
HVAC control, high-efficiency lighting, and motors 
measures. 
Onsite generation Projects include onsite generation 
technology 
Technologies include installation of onsite generation 
equipment and may include other energy efficiency measures 
(e.g., lighting, HVAC equipment and controls, motor 
efficiency measures). Onsite generation includes diesel 
backup generators, distributed PV systems, and biomass 
gasifiers, among others. 
Motors and drives Normalized project investment of 5 
$/ft2 or less. 
Technologies installed include industrial process equipment 
not directly related to HVAC, such as variable speed drives, 
pumps and priming systems, and electric motors.  
Water conservation Majority of dollar savings are from 
water savings 
Technologies installed include an array of water conservation 
measures that include low flow showers, faucets, urinals, and 
toilets, as well as meters and leak detection equipment. 
Non-energy Normalized project investment of 
$7/ft2 or more. Majority of dollar 
savings are non-energy savings. 
Technologies installed include roof or ceiling replacement, 
asbestos abatement (i.e., measures that are not installed 
primarily for their energy savings, but may have other types 
of savings), and projects may include other efficiency 
measures (e.g., lighting or HVAC upgrades). 
Other Projects include only these types of 
measures 
Technologies installed include installation of energy-efficient 
equipment such as vending machines, laundry or office 
equipment, high-efficiency refrigeration, staff training and 
utility tariff negotiation. These individual measures may also 
be included in other retrofit strategies (except lighting-only); 
projects categorized as “Other” retrofit strategy only installed 
these types of measures. 
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Standardization of dollar value of energy savings 
ESCOs may calculate and report monetary savings in many different ways, which complicates the 
comparison of project economics. To make the savings data comparable, we recalculate monetary 
value of savings by multiplying reported physical resource savings (electricity, natural gas, oil, and 
water) by standardized commodity prices. We follow the same dollar savings recalculation method 
developed in Larsen et al. (2012) for gas, oil and water savings. However, in this paper we refine the 
methodology for electricity savings by calculating energy and demand charges savings separately. 
Reported savings information requires a considerable amount of processing due to variations in the 
underlying data. For example, the monetary value of resource savings often varies over the lifetime of a 
project. We estimate an average annual savings equivalent by dividing the stream of monetary savings 
by the number of years of the performance contract. Projects may also report non-resource21 savings—
most commonly operations and maintenance (O&M) savings or capital cost avoidance. In these cases, 
we add the non-resource savings to the annual monetary resource savings to produce an estimate of 
the dollar value of savings from an ESCO project.  
Mean measure lifetime 
We utilize the same methodology to estimating mean measure lifetime for project measures specified in 
Appendix C of Larsen et al. (2012). 
A.2. Dominant retrofit strategy (DRS) methodology 
The current methodology to assign a DRS to a given project is based on the presence of a single type of 
measure and a hierarchical prioritization (see Appendix A.7 in Larsen et al. (2012) for details). In the 
original method, there are six possible DRS: Onsite Generation, Non-Energy, Major HVAC, Minor HVAC, 
Lighting-only, and Other. The methodology used in Hopper et al. (2005) used the same DRS but had a 
more refined approach to distinguish Major and Minor HVAC projects through a measure-specific cost 
analysis (see Appendix B in Hopper et al. (2005)). 
Our preliminary analysis suggested that an important cost driver was the mix of energy conservation 
measures and non-energy measures being installed, which we measure through the DRSs. Improving 
the accuracy of the DRS classification is critical for this paper. The main concerns we are trying to 
address with the DRS classification review are excessive projects classified in the ‘Onsite generation’ 
and ‘Major HVAC’ categories, which have higher priority in the current hierarchical structure. In parallel, 
we address the reduced number of projects classified in lower priority DRS by developing a quantitative 
approach that we describe below. 
First, we create the “Water conservation” and “Motors and drives” DRSs. Water conservation projects 
are low cost and their savings are relatively easy to measure. These projects were originally bundled in 
the “Non-energy” DRS, which includes expensive measures with little to no measurable savings. Motors                                                              21 Non-resource savings, often called non-energy benefits, are cost savings that accrue to ESCO projects from other sources besides energy and water use reduction and demand charge savings. 
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and drives types of measures are associated with industrial or commercial processes that are neither 
Major not Minor HVAC. There are enough motor and drives measures implemented to include these in 
their own DRS. 
Second, we analyze each DRS to propose possible new classification criteria.  
A.2.1 Onsite generation projects 
These projects are expected to be dominated by a single measure related to deployment of backup 
generation or renewable energy systems. We use a similar approach to Hopper et al. (2005) to better 
assess the actual contribution of an onsite generation measure to the overall project cost. Ultimately, 
we want to test whether onsite generation measures make projects more expensive or if more 
expensive projects include onsite generation but their costs may be driven by another strategy or a mix 
of them. 
To test this, we use ePB data for federal government Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
projects to determine the cost per unit of floor area for 20 measure categories. The measure category 
“renewable energy systems” has 44 projects developed in 2008-2017 with price and floor area data. 
Most of the measures installed in this category correspond to solar PV systems. The median cost of this 
measure is about 1 $/sqf and the 80% percentile value is about 3 $/sqf (all ePB monetary values in 
nominal dollars). 
We compare these values to the median value for cost per unit of floor area for “Onsite Generation” 
projects in the LBNL database that use the original DRS classification. We find that these projects 
present median values of 7 to 13 $/sqf in recent vintages. For further analysis, we split these projects in 
two bins depending on the proportion of measures that is an “onsite generation” measure. If a project 
has 20% or less of its measures identified as onsite generation, it is classified as “lower presence”. For 
projects with a high presence of this measure – that is, projects that are most likely dominated by 
onsite generation measures because there are few or no other measures installed – the median cost is 
about 13$/sqf. Projects with lower presence of this measure have median costs closer to 10 $/sqf.  
We run the previous analysis for projects that only install onsite generation measures and find a median 
cost of 13 $/sqf for 26 projects. This value is about 10 times higher than the one in ePB projects for this 
measure type. Comparing the ePB single measure cost with the LBNL database cost suggests the onsite 
generation measure may not be the dominant strategy when present in these projects. However, using 
the LBNL database values only suggests that onsite generation project costs are indeed dominated by 
that measure, regardless of the number of other measures implemented. 
We propose no changes in the onsite generation DRS assignment. The analysis supports the logic that 
even in projects with low presence of onsite generation measures the project costs seem to be driven 
by it. 
A.2.2 Major HVAC 
Major HVAC is one of the highest priority DRS. This translates to higher chance of misclassifying projects 
as Major HVAC in lieu of other DRS that could deploy a similar mix of measure that is dominated by a 
different strategy. 
   
33  
We run a similar analysis for projects classified as “Major HVAC” based on number of measures. We 
find about 90 projects that have 60% or more of their installed measures classified as “Major HVAC”. 
The median normalized cost for these projects is around 7.5-8 $/sqf. Projects with between 20% and 
50% of measures identified as Major HVAC have median costs of about 5.5 $/sqf. Projects below this 
threshold have normalized costs of about 3.5 $/sqf. 
This gradual decline in normalized cost as a function of the relative presence of Major HVAC measures 
suggests a cutoff or threshold to classify a project with a Major HVAC DRS. 
We analyze ePB data to find normalized values for typical Major HVAC measures such as boiler and 
chiller improvements and general HVAC. If we assume the joint presence of these three measures is 
equivalent to a major HVAC project, we find a median normalized cost of about 2.5-3 $/sqf (median 
costs of ~ 1 $/sqf for boiler and chiller and ~ 0.5 $/sqf for general HVAC). The ePB values are consistent 
with the cost cutoff criteria determined in Hopper et al. (2005) for Major HVAC technologies. 
The difference may also be explained by the fact that a Major HVAC project is composed from several 
measures of that type. We find that projects with relatively high presence of Major HVAC measures 
typically install 4 to 5 measures on a typical project. This would suggest an average cost per measure of 
1-1.5 $/sqf, closer to ePB measure level values. 
We propose setting a cutoff for Major HVAC projects at about 5 $/sqf. Projects identified as Major 
HVAC with a normalized cost below this level will be classified as “Minor HVAC” if they do not include 
motors and drives measures or “Motors and drives” if they do. This follows the same logic proposed in 
Hopper et al. (2005), with the extension for the new motors and drives DRS. 
A.2.3 Non-energy projects 
Non-energy projects are classified based on the presence of specific measures. There are 723 projects 
(13%) in the database that are classified as non-energy based on their measures only. However, we find 
that there is a significant amount of projects (~500) that are not classified as non-energy whose non-
energy dollar savings are larger than their energy savings. We know that many non-energy projects and 
measures may not report non-energy savings because it is hard to measure and verify them. However, 
we classify projects with a high proportion of non-energy savings into the non-energy DRS. We propose 
that projects with a share of non-energy dollar savings that exceed 50% or more of total savings are 
classified as non-energy projects. 
A.2.4 Water conservation projects 
 About 70 projects in the database (1.3%) are classified as water conservation project as the DRS. 
However, it should be noted that more than 2000 projects implement some type of water conservation 
measures. Among this group, we find that ~380 projects are not classified as water conservation even 
though the dollar value of water savings is 50% or more of total dollar savings. Following the same 
criteria as in non-energy savings, we propose that projects with a share of water dollar savings that are 
50% or more of total savings are classified as water conservation projects. 
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A.2.5 Remaining DRS 
The Motors and Drives and Minor HVAC DRSs are implicitly reclassified based on the Major HVAC cost 
threshold analysis. We make no changes to the Lighting Only DRS, as its classification is straightforward. 
A.2.6 Classification changes 
We compare the original and resulting classifications (Table A.2.1). The main result is redistribution from 
Major HVAC projects into Minor HVAC and motors and drives, plus non-energy. Median normalized 
costs for Minor and Major HVAC projects are much more differentiated now, which suggests the 
quantitative threshold implemented works as intended. 
Table A.2.1. Count and share of project comparison between original and new DRS classification 
method. 
 New method Larsen et al. (2012)  
 Count Share Count Share 
Non-energy 1398 25% 979 18% 
Major HVAC 1136 21% 1960 36% 
Minor HVAC 922 17% 667 12% 
Lighting-only 532 10% 570 10% 
Unknown 481 9% 543 10% 
Motors and drives 432 8% 227 4% 
Onsite generation 413 7% 438 8% 
Water conservation 144 3% 70 1% 
Other 52 1% 56 1% 
A.3. Electricity dollar savings methodology 
This section presents the original and new method devised in this paper to estimate electricity dollar 
savings from ESCO projects. 
A.3.1 Previous method to estimate the dollar value of electricity savings 
Historically, we calculated the dollar value of electricity savings from ESCO projects using both reported 
physical project savings and historical electricity price data from the EIA (e.g., Larsen et al. 2012). EIA 
provides state level-electric retail prices for a range of market sectors and utility service types over the 
period 1990-2015. However, these prices are not commodity rates. They are, in fact, gross utility 
revenues from energy and demand rates; services charges; taxes; and surcharges averaged over 
residential, commercial, and industrial sector sales. The prices are reported in dollars per kWh ($/kWh). 
For this reason, we cannot estimate the value of energy and demand reductions independently of each 
other. For projects that have large peak demand reductions, we may be under-estimating monetary 
benefits. For projects that do not report demand charge savings, we may be over-estimating monetary 
energy savings. 
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A.3.2 New method to estimate the dollar value of electricity savings 
 
 
We developed a methodology that employs actual utility energy and demand rates in order to address 
this gap in demand valuation and overall bias in electricity savings calculations. The NREL Utility Rate 
Database contains more than 26,000 commercial and industrial rates from nearly 3,000 utilities across 
the U.S. Rates are reported for four sectors—Industrial, Commercial, Residential, and Street Lighting—
and in two voltage delivery levels. Some demand rates vary with the time of day, so the data is classified 
according to “periods” during which a particular rate prevails. These rates may also have multiple tiers, 
with higher tiers representing the time when demand exceeds a specified threshold. Unfortunately, we 
do not know when project demand reductions occur, so we cannot assume a particular rate period is 
correct for a given project. To address this, we utilize the most common demand rate available in the 
schedules, which also happens to be the lowest rate compared to other periods. We believe that using a 
more conservative approach (i.e., lowest rates) reduces concern about picking the incorrect rate based 
on limited/no information on the actual timing of the demand reduction. 
The first step in calculating the rates involves filtering the NREL Utility Rate Database to remove rates 
not applicable to ESCO projects. These rates include those for agriculture, electric vehicles, and 
transmission projects. The NREL database does not specify whether rates are bundled or delivery-only, 
but a preliminary analysis of energy rates found a very low incidence of delivery-only rates. Since 
delivery-only rates would not contain the energy portion that drives prices, we exclude energy rates less 
than $.03 ($/kWh). We also remove demand rates less than $0 ($/kW) as they are likely a result of data 
Historcal EIA 
Data
•Calculate price scaling factors for each state, sector, and year relative to reference year
NREL Utility 
Rate Database
•Filter database for applicable rates
•Apply EIA scaling factors to put all rates in 2014 equivalent
•Adjust rates by inflation to $2016 dollars.
•Calculate median rates for each state and sector
•Apply scaling factors to estimate rates for 1990-2016 period
LBNL-NAESCO 
Databse
•Create composite kW and kWh values based on available data
•Assign sector to each project
•Assign median rates by sector, state, and year
•Calculate kW and kWh dollar savings
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entry errors. Filtering the NREL database removed 30% of the reported rates available in the 2011-2017 
period. We adjusted all of the applicable rates to 2016 dollars. 
The NREL utility rate database has limited time-series coverage - ~80% of its rates are from 2010 to 
2017, but ~ 70% of projects in the LBNL-NAESCO database were installed before this period. The 
volatility of commodity prices precludes the use of such recent rates over a broad time-series. We 
address this limitation by scaling the NREL rates with historical utility prices from EIA.   
We populate a rate time-series for all sectors and states for the period 1990-2016 that accounts for 
state level price changes. As noted earlier, the EIA data we use are not rates, but prices calculated as 
total utility collections divided by sales. We begin by calculating average prices for each state and sector 
and year in our study period. We then take each price and divide it by the price from the same state and 
sector from a reference year. We use 2014 as this reference year because it is the year with the most 
rates in the NREL database.  
The scaling occurs in two stages. First we scale all of the rates in the NREL database to the reference 
year and calculate median energy and demand rates for commercial, industrial, and residential sectors 
in each state. We use medians to identify rates because of the variation in rates both across and within 
utilities. Then, we multiply each of these median rates by the appropriate scaling factor for a given state, 
sector, and year. This procedure results in a time series of rates modulated with the price trends 
contained in the EIA data. 
In parallel, we assign projects in the LBNL-NAESCO database to one of two rate classes (commercial or 
industrial) based on the reported market segments. We designate industrial and military projects as 
industrial, housing projects as ‘Residential’ and all others as ‘Commercial’. Finally, we assign the 
applicable commercial (industrial) rates to each LBNL-NAESCO project. 
ESCOs report physical energy and demand reductions as either “actual”, “guaranteed”, or “projected”. 
To maximize sample size, we create composite energy and demand savings fields populated with these 
three categories according to a hierarchy of preference. We use actual savings whenever possible, but 
use guaranteed when actual savings are not available. Finally, we use projected savings when neither 
guaranteed savings nor actual savings are available. We adjust projected savings using historical ratios 
between projected and actual savings. We perform a quality control check over reported demand 
charge savings by comparing them with the reported base kW when available, discarding values with 
unusually high or low percentage savings. Finally, we calculate a demand and energy dollar savings for 
projects in the LBNL-NAESCO database.  
Based on our analysis, we assume demand savings are reported as peak demand savings. Since demand 
charges are expressed in $/kW-month we multiply the savings by 12 to express them as an annual 
equivalent. Finally, we multiply the composite energy field by the assigned rate to estimate dollar 
savings and add it to the demand charge savings. 
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A.4. Regression analysis and results 
In this section, we expand on the regression specification and its results. 
A.4.1 Specification 
The main reason for using a multivariate regression approach is to disentangle the how the types and 
number of measures in project affect its overall cost. We employ the following econometric model to 
study the relationship between project investment levels and other project factors: 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6
∙ 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
Where i is the developer and t is the group for the Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition. We use the 
following categorical variables: 
• “ESPC” is a dummy binary variable set to 1 for performance contracting projects.  
• “retrofit_strat” corresponds to one of the 7 dominant retrofit strategy described in Table A.1.2 
(projects classified as “Other” and “Unknown” are omitted from the analysis). We use the 
Lighting Only strategy as the reference. 
In addition, we use the following numerical variables: 
• “floorarea” corresponds to the average floor area retrofitted for the pooled projects. We 
hypothesize that larger projects are more expensive. 
• “savings” corresponds to the average physical energy savings in MMBTu achieved by the pooled 
projects. We hypothesize that projects with higher savings are more expensive. 
• “num_measures” corresponds to the average count of measures installed for the pooled 
projects. This is a measure of comprehensiveness. We hypothesize that more comprehensive 
projects are more expensive. 
We use non-logged variables to make the coefficients directly represent the increase in absolute project 
cost. We tested a logged version of all numerical variables – the three listed above plus the dependent 
variable – with similar results. This assumption is validated when studying the distribution of residuals 
(see Figures A.4.1 and A.4.2).  
We include ESCO fixed effects in our specification to account for the idiosyncratic effect that a given 
ESCO may have on specific projects. For example, a large ESCO (ESCO A) may capture economies of 
scale that a smaller ESCO (ESCO B) does not. Controlling for other factors, projects developed by ESCO A 
would be cheaper than projects developed by ESCO B would be. We can capture this with this fixed 
effect and therefore not attribute this variation in cost to one of the explanatory variables. Note that in 
doing so, we assume that ESCOs are unchanged in time, which is not completely accurate as they have 
grown and merged with other ESCOs. 
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A.4.2 Results analysis 
A.4.2.1 Residual plots 
Residual plots for groups A (last vintage) and B (first vintage) are shown below 
 
Figure A.4.1. Residual plot for last vintage (Group A) regression 
 
 
Figure A.4.2. Residual plot for first vintage (Group B) regression 
A.4.2.2 Multicollinearity 
We analyze the potential multicollinearity between the continuous and categorical variables in our 
specification: floor area, savings, comprehensiveness, and investment levels, plus six of the seven DRS 
dummy variables (remove Lighting-only to prevent perfect collinearity). We calculate variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to test for collinearity among explanatory variables. VIFs are constructed by running a 
regression of each explanatory variable on the remaining variables and using the R2 value to construct 
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the factor (O’brien, 2007). Higher levels of VIF – in the order of 5 to 10 – will signal multicollinearity is 
present. 
We run the analysis for the industry as a whole and find no collinearity among the covariates of interest. 
Table A.4.1. Variance inflation factor results 
Covariate VIF 
Floor area 1.37 
Resource savings (MMBtu) 1.47 
Comprehensiveness (number of different project 
measures) 1.39 
Cost 1.68 
ESPC 1.13 
Major HVAC 2.65 
Minor HVAC 2.29 
Motors and drives 1.99 
Non-energy 2.97 
Onsite generation 1.78 
Water conservation 1.11 
 
A.4.3 Analysis of other factors that may affect project investment levels 
There is little if any publicly-available information on the actual cost structure of ESCO projects. The 
LBNL/NAESCO database contains sufficient project level financial information to determine total 
implementation expenditures with and without financing, but no information about various 
expenditures that make up the total project investment levels. In its simplest form, direct project 
investment levels without financing (and excluding any incentives offered by utilities for high efficiency 
measures) can be decomposed into labor and materials costs, and a markup that includes indirect costs, 
overhead and profit. Changes in any of these three cost components – labor, materials, and markup – 
could also help explain increases in project investment levels that are not captured in the regression 
analysis based on reported factors. 
In this section, we examine trends in labor and materials costs for which there are publicly available 
data, and use the findings as a proxy for ESCO project labor and materials cost trends. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is no data that can act as a proxy for markup so we make no attempt to estimate 
it. However, we use data from the ePB database to look for some evidence of markup trends over time. 
A.4.3.1 Real labor costs have grown less than 10% during the analysis period 
In earlier research, ESCO executives reported that labor costs were the most significant contributor to 
rising project investment levels (Larsen et al. 2012). To quantitatively test this hypothesis, we use data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on employment compensation for private industry 
workers in the construction sector as a proxy for direct skilled labor costs in the ESCO industry (BLS, 
2017). We believe this subgroup adequately represents the technical skills of labor employed in the 
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installation of energy efficiency projects. We considered other types of blue-collar labor employment 
cost indexes and verified that conclusions remain unchanged. 
Labor costs associated to this subgroup have grown approximately 8% in real terms from 2001 (the 
earliest year with available data) to 2017 (see Figure A.4.3). The impact of these labor cost increases on 
ESCO project economics depends on ESCO and project cost structures and their evolution over time, 
however we lack the data to model them. However, given the relatively modest increases, it is likely the 
contribution of labor costs to ESCO project investment level increases is relatively small. 
 
Figure A.4.3. Real compensation growth for private industry construction skilled labor across the 
U.S. for the period 2001-2017 
A.4.3.2 Materials and equipment cost variation is mixed and their effect is undetermined 
Materials cost trends might also help explain the rise in project investment levels reported in earlier 
sections. Assessing the impact of the cost of materials and equipment is not straightforward due to the 
wide variety of materials and equipment used in ESCO projects. Moreover, while we know the measure 
composition for projects in our dataset, we do not know the relative weight of the different measures 
installed, in terms of their investment level or contribution to resource savings. This means that even if 
we account for a diversity of materials and/or equipment price indexes, we do not have a 
straightforward way to apply these indexes to project data. Finally, we do not know how much of the 
project investment level consists of materials as opposed to other components such as labor and 
markup. Thus we are unable to assess the impact of certain equipment or material cost increases on 
overall project investment levels. 
We can, however, measure temporal trends in materials costs and compare those to temporal trends 
from our findings. We use the Producer Price Index (PPI) by Industry reported by the Economic 
Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (St Louis Fed Reserve, 2017). We examine the 
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HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment, measures commonly installed in ESCO projects. We use 
the GDP deflator employed in our previous calculations on the nominal PPI values to remove the effect 
of inflation and estimate the index in real 2016 dollars. 
The information for HVAC is only available from 2003 to 2016. Real HVAC prices grew steadily from 
2003 to about 2008-2009, when the great recession hit. From that point on, real HVAC prices stagnated 
(see Figure A.4.4). To extend the data over our entire period of analysis (1997-2017) we estimate the 
average growth trend for the 2003-2009 HVAC price data points and extrapolate back to 1997. 
 
 
Figure A.4.4. Real HVAC price index for 1997-2002 (estimated) and 2003-2016 (observed) 
Using this approach, we estimate that real HVAC prices have increased about 35% since the first vintage 
(1990-1997). Depending on project cost structure, HVAC prices may help explain part of the ESCO 
project investment levels increases during the 1997-2008 period (the first three vintages). HVAC price 
trends, however, cannot explain the investment level increases during the ARRA and post-ARRA periods 
because during those periods HVAC prices remained virtually flat. 
In contrast, costs for other equipment installed by ESCOs such as photovoltaic (PV) systems have 
decreased significantly during our analysis period. Median costs for PV systems of a capacity below 500 
kW – the most usual size installed by ESCO customers – decreased from $12/W in 1998 to around $4/W 
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in 2015 (Barbose and Darghouth, 2016). The declining costs of PV would be expected to have pushed 
project investment levels downward, reducing overall ESCO project investment level increases. 
.4.3.3 Markup has probably remained stable and not affected investment level increases 
Markup can include indirect costs, overhead and profit margin, among other expenses. There is 
evidence for an increased markup in small and medium firms in the U.S. in recent years (Loecker and 
Eeckhout, 2017). However, in fully competitive markets firms would have little incentive to increase 
markup because increasing markup would increase prices for customers and decrease competitive 
advantage. We might expect to observe little change in markup over time, particularly in markets with 
high product or service commodification, in which there is little differentiation in terms of the product 
or service provided. In contrast, ESCO projects are quite customized and involve significant transaction 
costs for developing tailored proposals and maintaining client relationships (Stuart et al., 2016). 
A potential increase in markup does not necessarily relate to lack of competition. Evidence suggests 
that ESCOs may be facing increasing competition from other energy efficiency providers (e.g., HVAC or 
lighting companies) and distributed renewable energy installers, which may be driving  higher client 
acquisition and retention costs (Stuart et al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, there is no markup data or any proxy for it in the LBNL/NAESCO database. However, the 
eProject Builder (ePB) database includes a markup percentage field for each project. In ePB, markup is 
comprised of ESCO overhead and profit, applied as a single blanket percentage across all of the 
implemented ECMs and NEMs. Median project markup is approximately 23% to 25%, and has remained 
relatively stable across the four vintages for which there are available data (from 1998 to 2017). While 
markup may be a significant portion of total ESCO project investment levels, it does not appear to 
contribute to project investment levels increases over time because it has remained unchanged during 
the analysis period. 
As discussed in Section 4 of the manuscript, nearly all of the projects in ePB are federal sector projects, 
so the results are only applicable to this market segment. It is possible that the markup percentages 
differ in other market sectors. However, based on the stability of federal project markups, we believe it 
is unlikely that changes in project markup for any market sector contribute significantly to overall ESCO 
industry project investment level changes. 
A.4.4 Additional notes 
A.4.4.1 Selection bias 
The LBNL/NAESCO database is populated with projects from the NAESCO accreditation process. ESCOs 
submit detailed data for a sample of projects developed in the years prior to the accreditation. 
Guidelines suggest projects should provide a good overview of the ESCO activity, but do not require 
projects to be selected in any particular way. It is possible that ESCOs cherry-pick the projects they send 
into accreditation 
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A.5. Additional figures 
 
 
Figure A.5.1. Share of investment by vintage using ECM level data from ePB database. 
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Figure A.5.2. Share of investment by vintage, market, and DRS. 
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A.6. LBNL/NAESCO data fields 
Table A.6.1 – taken from Goldman et al. (2005) – describes the data collected for projects uploaded into 
the LBNL/NAESCO database. The table also includes the share of projects that satisfactorily report each 
field. 
 
Table A.6.1. Data fields collected for LBNL/NAESCO database projects 
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